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In this paper I seek to resurrect the bugbear of Soviet history, the question of 
ideology. Until recently it appeared that the problem of Soviet ideology had 
died from sheer fatigue and been given a decent burial by the revisionist social 
historians. With the turn to social history, the focus of historians shifted from 
the primacy of politics and ideology in the Soviet Union to the social bases of 
Stalinism, and one rarely came across ideology as an analytical problem. 
Recently, however, a consideration of ideology has raised its hydra head 
impelled not only by those who seek to vindicate the totalitarian interpretation 
of Soviet history, but also by new theoretical approaches that have expanded 
the definition of ideology - of how it shapes identities, informs behaviour, 
and provides frameworks for interpreting experiences at both the individual 
and social level.' 
I will not recapitulate the movement towards cultural history with its new 
emphasis on the importance of language and narratives, both spoken and 
written, elite and vernacular, in the construction and apprehension of 
experience.2 If language prefigures reality then we have no access to the past 
except through it, and rather than seeing language merely as a medium that 
conveys value-neutral information, we have to critically interrogate the literary 
genres, narrative structures, inflections of idiom, the complexities of reference, 
the self-representations and the anxieties woven into the texture of historical 
sources. Does this then make the historian a literary critic andlor a scholar of 
hermeneutics? 
In this essay I propose to undertake a three-pronged analysis. First, I 
would like to trace the historical trajectory of the role of ideology in Western 
literature on the Soviet Union. Since this in itself is a lengthy undertaking I will 
focus on the works of a few seminal scholars such as Bertram Wolfe, Sheila 
Fitzpatrick and Stephen Kotkin. Then, I will survey a few key Western texts on 
the history of Soviet women and show how the authors have analyzed the role 
that ideology played both in conceptualization and the implementation of 
Soviet policies towards women. Finally, I will conclude with a few remarks on 
the gendered nature of Soviet ideology and propaganda. 
TOTALITARIANISM, REVISIONISM, AND IDEOLOGY 
Western Sovietologists used ideology in its instrumental capacity to 
explain all political innovations in the Soviet Union. In the totalitarian school 
of historiography, ideology was considered an important armament in the 
Bolshevik arsenal, and along with the use of terror, seen primarily as means of 
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ensuring social obedience and cont~-oL3 Given the repressive nature of the 
state, it was commonly believed that there was' little convergence between 
popular ideals and the state-mandated system of values. The Communist Party 
was accused of wanting to recreate both the individual and the world in its own 
image. According to Bertram Wolfe, one of the more astute commentators on 
the Soviet Union, "its aim is nothing less than to keep society atomized and to 
create as rapidly and as completely as the recalcitrant human material and the 
refractory surrounding world will permit, a new man, a new society, and a new 
world."4 
While this utopian impulse has an invidious connotation in the context of 
political liberalism as an infringement on the rights of the individual, 
according to Marxist thought, ideology becomes praxis or meaningful activity 
only when it is aimed at transforming the world. However, this explanation was 
subsumed by more sinister interpretations that emphasized the Bolsheviks' 
quest for total power. Moreover, since the Bolsheviks consciously acted as 
kulturtraegers, making little attempt to conceal the extent, form, and nature of 
their "civilizing mission," the values they sought to inculcate were seen 
interchangeably as ideology and propaganda by the outside world.5 
Sovietologists commonly referred to the Soviet Union as an ideological state, 
implying that its very dedication to ideology represented an aberration from 
the normal evolution of nation-states. "To a far greater extent than most 
political systems, the Soviet system is the creation of a consciously articulated 
body of ideas - the ideology."6 
Wolfe saw the Bolshevik revolution primarily as a result of Lenin's 
ruthless drive for power. Again, I quote, "the basic ideology of Marxism- 
Leninism is structural in character. Organization, centralization, monopoly of 
economic power and spiritual power, permanent dictatorship, force 
unrestricted by anything - these were the substances of Lenin's dreams from 
1902  onward^."^ Lenin's faith in his own theoretical insights led him to a 
grotesque distortion of Marxism, and in Wolfe's account we see the Bolshevik 
revolution unfold on a stage bereft of actors and driven solely by the power of 
Lenin's maniacal ideas. Although Wolfe never states his definition of ideology, 
it is clear from his account that he views Leninism as a succinct guide to 
action, a blueprint for transforming or shaping the world. 
Other historians from the totalitarian school reiterated this basic tenet and 
viewed Marxism-Leninism as a means of legitimizing relations of domination 
and upholding social hierarchies in the Soviet Union. Soviet ideology was seen 
as little more than a set of utopian dogmas imposed on a sullen population. 
Even Robert Daniels, who distanced himself considerably from the older 
interpretations by claiming that the October Revolution was more an accident 
than a planned coup, nevertheless concluded that Stalinist ideology divested 
itself of its Marxist intellectual content to more effectively drown both the 
individual and society in sea of false consciousnes~.~ Indeed, according to 
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Daniels, Marxism-Leninism was used merely to legitimize programs that had 
been adopted for other practical reasons. 
Martin Malia is an original voice in this field in that he insists that it is 
impossible to understand the Soviet revolution without the grand idea of 
socialism, its commitment to social equality through the abolition of the 
market, private property, and the state control of economy. Indeed Malia is also 
unique in that he tries to explain the underlying ethical motivation that 
provided the justification for using coercion on an unimaginable scale.9 
Two things need to be pointed out in this historiographic context. First, 
these historians have used a very rigidly Marxist definition of ideology. In 
German Ideology, criticizing religious and metaphysical ideas that convey a 
false impression of the world, Marx and Engels wrote, "if in all ideology men 
and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the 
inversion of objects in the retina does from their physical life-process."10 
According to Marx, in any given historical epoch, the prevalent ideas are 
usually those produced by the dominant class or those that express their 
aspirations and interests. At the same time, these ideas are held up as having 
universal validity and significance. This produces a false consciousness that 
masks the class conflicts in society while legitimizing the domination of the 
ruling class. Although few historians from the totalitarian school attempted a 
class analysis of Soviet society, they nonetheless viewed Marxist-Leninist 
ideology as a means through which the Partylnomenklatura dominated the 
Soviet people and induced acquiescence among the population to the regime's 
terroristic policies. 
But as Karl Mannheim has shown, not all ideologies are geared towards 
conscious deception. In fact most historical epochs contain ideas that 
transcend the existing order, but as long as they do not succeed in realizing 
their projected contents they can be called ideologies of the age. Utopias on the 
other hand are wish-dreams that aim at the transformation of societies. 
Mannheim also argues that it is only in retrospect that one can distinguish 
between the ideological and the utopian, as these do not occur separately in a 
historical process. The designation of what is utopian or ideological depends to 
a large degree on the social position of the observer as the utopias of an 
ascendant class are often permeated with the ideological elements and the 
difference between the two can only be verified by historical process." 
Bolshevik ideology was unique in that it tried to encode the utopian, 
serving both as a means of social control and fuel for revolutionary 
experimentation and radical change. And this was especially true in the 
Stalinist period when state sponsored policies promoted maximum social 
disruption as well as the social conservatism of the "Great Retreat."12 Although 
Richard Stites has commented on the decline of "social day-dreaming" with 
the advent of Stalin and the imposition of a single administrative utopia, this 
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was not necessarily the case. Rather, there was a replacement of utopian ideals 
of a certain section of the avant-garde intelligentsia with a complex of other 
competing utopian discourses that constituted Stalinism. Ideals of a welfare 
state, the aspirations to a super power status in the world order, the attempts to 
institute socialist realism in both art and life, and even the creation of legions 
of modern Soviet heroes and heroines cannot easily be accommodated under 
the rubric of the "anti-utopian utopian state" that Stites has described.I3 
Subsequently, with the turn to social history, under the auspices of Sheila 
Fitzpatrick's pioneering work, historians presented a new and dynamic model 
of Soviet society that encapsulated both the use of terror and popular 
participation, and represented the Bolshevik revolution as a conduit of social 
mobility for the young and the ambitious. Perhaps, as a reaction to the 
totalitarian model's obsession with Bolshevik propaganda, these historians 
sought to downplay the role of ideology as a primus casus in Soviet society. 
While Fitzpatrick, Viola and Chase explained the capacity of Stalinist rhetoric 
to exhort and motivate young Bolshevik cadres, Bolshevik-speak itself was not 
subjected to detailed scrutiny.'4 
Fitzpatrick's work, given its exhaustive sweep and analytical grandeur is 
difficult to summarize. According to her, the Stalinist state was relentless in its 
antipathy to capitalism and was committed to building socialism by destroying 
private enterprise, and promoting economic growth and modernization 
through state planning. Fitzpatrick argues that Bolsheviks never lost their 
ideological adherence to a certain variant of Marxism, nonetheless she shows 
that their analytical approach was highly creative and pragmatic especially 
when it came to the issue of class. While the Bolsheviks continued to use a 
class analysis in interpreting Soviet material reality and, in fact, legitimized 
their power as the vanguard of the working class, the definitions of who 
constituted the proletariat changed according to new political situations and 
calculations. 
The classical bourgeoisie and aristocracy, stock characters in the Marxist 
morality play, were replaced by the professional intelligentsia, and later the 
kulaks, as the class enemy. This was despite the fact that the bourgeois 
specialists held a privileged position in Soviet society until 1929 and recovered 
much of their status in the aftermath of the Purges. More problematic for the 
Bolsheviks was the definition of what constituted the working class. Especially 
since the worker base of the party was seriously eroded during the Civil War 
while the number of intelligentsia dominating both the Party and the economy 
grew proportionately. A compromise was reached by increasing worker 
representation in the administration and restricting the definition of proletarian 
to those with a factory affiliation in 1917 or at the time of entry to the party. 
Later, in the 1930s, as millions of peasants entered the ranks of the working 
class, the definition of proletarian consciousness was expanded to mean 
enthusiastic support for the construction of socialism and political loyalty. 
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Ultimately, the bourgeois specialists were physically replaced by Stalinist 
cadres of proletarianlpeasant intelligentsia who came to dominate the Soviet 
Union politically. 
Soviet citizens for their part used the ideological definitions provided by 
the state to articulate their identities, construct life histories, denounce 
personal enemies, and even legitimize subversion and resistance as acts of 
political loyalty.'5 What remains unclear in the narrative, however, is the true 
role of ideology in Stalinist calculations. Did the regime's ideological 
assumptions dictate policies such as the class warfare of the Cultural 
Revolution and the Great Purges or was the repeated ideological revisionism of 
class definitions a post hoc rationalization of unintended consequences? 
Recently, Stephen Kotkin, in his provocative study of the "Soviet 
civilization," has brought to the forefront the role propaganda and ideology 
played in the construction of Soviet identities and Soviet realities.16 
"Bolshevism itself, including its evolution, must be seen not merely as a set of 
institutions, a group of personalities, or as an ideology but as a cluster of 
powerful symbols and attitudes, a language and new forms of speech, new 
ways of behaving in public and private, even new styles of dress - in short, as 
an ongoing experience through which it was possible to imagine and strive to 
bring about a new civilization called socialism."17 
Kotkin has radically expanded the concept of ideology from the 
totalitarian definition of a political blueprint to something akin to an 
anthropological definition of culture as elaborated by Clifford Geertz.I8 The 
term ideology can be used in both a restrictive manner as a specific set of 
beliefs, or as something more inchoate that colours our beliefs and structures 
social practices. According to Althusser, ideology is not merely a distorted 
representation of real social relations, but a means through which human 
beings live their relation to their world and reproduce the conditions of their 
existence. Ideology has a material existence as expressed through social 
practices and rituals.19 Thus in Kotkin's account we see the inhabitants of 
Magnitogorsk struggling to speak Bolshevik, an4 given the lack of other 
competing discourses, articulating their identities in the intellectual categories 
that the Party makes available. While Soviet citizens adapted their behavior to 
the prevailing ecosystem they in turn helped to shape it. 
Kotkin also refuses to see in Stalinism, the revolution betrayed. Instead he 
views certain concepts as fundamental and integral to the Bolshevik mental 
architecture that span the continuum of Stalinism. One is the notion of the 
progressive and modem welfare state, the other the rejection of the inequities 
of capitalism. Finally, Kotkin sees in the existence of a hostile and immoral 
capitalist world, the raison d'itre and staying power of Stalinism. In fact 
Kotkin uses the continual viability of these concepts to counter critics who 
allege that under Stalin "ideological" considerations were subsumed by 
"practical" ones.*O Kotkin dismisses the revival of chauvinistic nationalism, 
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growing conservatism towards family issues, and the crackdown on abortion as 
mere policy shifts rather than an abandonment of the revolutionary idealism. 
But as these so-called "policy shifts" are not analyzed in any great detail it 
seems more an assertion than a serious engagement with the "Great Retreat" 
thesis. Moreover, at one level while Kotkin appears to argue that Bolshevik 
ideology was elastic, fluid, and created in part by the engagement of both the 
state and the people, on another, he represents ideology as a set of unchanging 
moral choices and a certain worldview that the Stalinist state adhered to and 
managed to inculcate in its people. 
Finally, the concepts that Kotkin has used as the central premises of his 
monograph, the notion of social justice, the evolution of a welfare state, the 
negative representations of capitalism and by extension the West were not 
static symbols and categories. In public propaganda these were constantly 
being constructed and re-constructed. And as Moshe Lewin has shown, the 
syncretism of Stalinist ideology and its ability to import a variety of ideas, 
rituals, myths and symbols that were antithetical to Marxism gave it both its 
resilience and uniquenew2' In the final analysis, what might have held 
Bolshevik ideology together was perhaps less the purity of its central tenets, 
than the literary conventions and stylistic repetitions which imposed on its 
many dissonances a seeming ~ni for rn i ty .~~ 
IDEOLOGY AND WOMEN'S HI STORY*^ 
In an introduction to a study, Frederic Jameson referred to its 
"organizational fiction," the textual strategy of a work that sets out to resolve a 
problem that the author creates in the first place.24 Soviet historiography seems 
replete with organizational fictions, as reflected in titles of monographs, such 
as Reshenie zhenskogo voprosa, Opyt KPSS v reshenie zhenskogo voprosa. 
During the Soviet era perceived social and political problems of Soviet society 
were indiscriminately quantified and represented as circumscribed and self- 
limiting phenomena, which would succumb to a concerted socialist offensive 
(nastuplenie). The successful conclusion of these campaigns was a foregone 
conclusion, as the problem was usually posed in terms of its ultimate 
resolution. 
In western historiography too, we have our organizational fictions that 
curiously mirror Soviet counterparts. Thus for example a disproportionate 
share of our scholarship is concerned with disproving Soviet claims about their 
achievements in the field of women's liberation, or exposing the "truth" of 
awful misogyny that lay behind Soviet assertions of having attained gender 
parity. Like their Soviet counterparts, western historians have accepted the 
notion of a "zhenskii vopros" (woman question) as a self-contained social 
problem that could either be resolved or shelved through resolute action 
undertaken by the Party. 
Unlike the more contradictory attitudes exhibited towards the principles of 
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Marxism by academics, by and large historians have enthusiastically endorsed 
the basic premises of Marxist feminism, that is the incorporation of women 
into wage labour, the democratization of the patriarchal family, the 
communalization of housework, and the elimination of gender disparity in the 
private and public sphere. What then annoys these historians is the failure of 
the Soviet Union to institute any of these goals in a meaningful fashion. Thus 
Aleksandra Kollontai's story is usually told in tragic mode of a visionary who 
ran into the shoals of Bolshevik misogyny and conservatism while trying to 
advance a radical feminist agenda that was ahead of its time.25 
Other histories plot the decline of the Soviet regime's commitment to 
feminism from the heyday of the Civil War to the reactionary nightmare of the 
1930s. We are unsure as to when the rot set in, was it the Civil War, the NEF', 
the First Five-Year Plan? Recently, Wendy Goldman has written a provocative 
book in which she attributes the failure of the Bolsheviks to recreate the 
patriarchal family along democratic lines to the innate conservatism of Russian 
women rather than to the traditional values espoused by the policy makers.26 
She points to the economic factors that made it impossible for the Zhenotdel to 
establish childcare institutions and other communal services. At the same time 
she shows that both proletarian and peasant women felt that it was impossible 
to raise families in the grim economic climate of the 1920s without the 
contribution of fathers and husbands. Both Beatrice Farnsworth and Barbara 
Clements agree with Goldman that the Bolsheviks adopted a more traditional 
social policy in the 1920s towards the family. Ultimately it was easier and 
cheaper to shore up the traditional nuclear family, rather than create a true 
welfare state that would assume responsibility for all Soviet children. But 
unlike Goldman, these two scholars privilege ideological conservatism as the 
main determinant of state policy rather than the actions of Russian women 
them~elves .~~ 
Elizabeth Wood too has foregrounded the issue of ideology by showing 
that Bolshevik ideas on women's liberation did not change significantly in the 
1920s .~~  Instead, she argues that at inception, these ideas were artificially 
grafted onto underlying nineteenth-century Russian attitudes of misogynous 
disdain towards women, ones in which 'they were perceived primarily as 
backward, uncultured mothers who needed male tutelage. It was the uneasy 
coexistence of a commitment to draw women into the public sphere coupled 
with an innate hostility to anything that smacked of feminism that gave 
Bolshevik ideology its ambiguous and tense character. According to Wood 
these narratives of backwardness went a long way in perpetuating Bolshevik 
hostility and indifference to women's issues even though the debates about 
gender allowed the Bolsheviks significant power to shape family life and 
intimate private relationships. Traditional gender connotations were retained 
even while the Bolsheviks professed that they were turning the "baba" into a 
"comrade," and women were exhorted to be mothers to the society at large. 
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Others scholars such as Bonnell, Waters, and Bernstein, in their work on 
representations of women in public iconography, tend to read female icons as 
either superfluous or even inimical to the revolution. Positive models such as 
the kolkhoznitsa were usually considered unrepresentative of reality, and 
eventually subordinated to the male counterparts who were overwhelmingly 
chosen to personify the important processes and events in Bolshevik hist01-y.~~ 
According to a recent article on representations of gender in Soviet art of the 
late 1930s, Susan Reid claims that "the audience for images directly promoting 
the Stalin cult was imagined as female, and spectatorship was construed as an 
act of 'feminine' identification and ~ubmission."~~ In this article one reads 
feminine as passive, slavish, uncritical and gullible. Finally, there seems to be 
a near consensus that Stalinism represented the nadir of the women's position 
in the Soviet Union. While the state claimed to have achieved the liberation of 
women in a flood of self-serving propaganda, in reality all affirmative action 
policies were abandoned as women were turned into workhorses-cum-brood 
mares. The patriarchal family, renamed as socialist, was glorified, divorce 
became difficult to obtain, abortion was declared illegal, and women were 
exhorted to both produce and reproduce for the sake of the n a t i ~ n . ~ '  
Of course there are a few exceptions to this line of argument and both 
Sheila Fitzpatrick and Roberta Manning have claimed that in the countryside 
the state was committed to policies that were aimed at liberating rural women 
from patriarchal domination and enrolling them in non-traditional pursuits.32 
And Richard Stites struck a more optimistic note when he asserted that a 
commitment to women's emancipation survived the Thermidor imposed by 
Stalin and resurfaced as one of the more enduring strands of Soviet ideology.33 
It is interesting that the debate is polarized primarily in moral terms, on 
the axis of liberation versus conservatism. I believe that this is due primarily to 
the influence of liberal-feminism, an ideology that views woman as a unitary 
subject, with legally defined rights and obligations whose emancipation can be 
plotted precisely on a graph. Also the notion that a regime must be accountable 
to its own rhetoric pervades much of the western critique of the Bolshevik 
regime. Presumably if the Bolsheviks had not advanced an agenda of liberation 
they would not be held accountable to fulfilling it. 
In a recent monograph, Nancy Ries has argued that while some cultures 
locate value in distinctive consumerism, or ritual participation, Russians 
privilege language above all other things, and see it as one of their most 
valuable resources.34 Historians have blamed the Soviets for failing to solve 
the "woman question" and criticized the hypocrisy that underlay the pervasive 
revolutionary rhetoric about gender equality. But the non-correspondence of 
ideology and reality constituted an important element of the Soviet experience. 
Soviet propaganda for women was characterized by a literary style that was 
marked by what we read as excess, exaggeration, falsifications, distortions, 
embellishment, fantasy and over-statements. Our liberal orientation may lead 
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us to denounce a style of political narration that lacks material accountability, 
but one should not discount the importance of changes at the ideological and 
linguistic level. The capacity to imagine and articulate scenarios of radical 
change in women's lives was not a substitute for concrete action, but was in 
itself an act of power and a form of political practice. 
Rather than focus on those aspects of women's liberation that seem the 
closest or farthest to our political convictions one can decipher alternative 
patterns in Bolshevik ideology and propaganda. Although Bolshevik ideology 
for women aspired to create a set of enduring myths about the "New Soviet 
Woman," the exigencies of the revolutionary situation tended to destabilize 
gendered identities. As a result the public selfhood of Soviet women was 
constantly mediated by competing definitions of class, occupation, sex, family, 
community, citizenship, party and state. Female identity in the Soviet Union 
was constructed as a continuum, composed of various building blocks or 
ideograms.35 These ideograms or sound bites were deeply symbolic and 
functioned as a convenient shorthand to more complex philosophical 
assumptions. Ideograms could be re-arranged to suit the demands of the 
current political situation or could be reinforced by the importation of new 
ones. At the linguistic level, ideological innovations could be rendered 
mundane, while continuity could be represented as revolutionary. Rather than 
seeing a strict disjuncture between the ideological radicalism of the early years 
and the conservatism of the 1930s, I would argue that there was considerable 
continuity of certain patterns of discourse pertaining to women that cannot be 
easily classified under the moral polarization of emancipatory or reactionary. 
Although Bolshevik thinking about the "woman question," was grounded 
in classical Marxism and Social-Democratic thought, public propaganda took 
selectively and creatively from this philosophical bedrock, emphasizing 
different aspects at various historical moments and periods. Engels, in his The 
Origin ofthe Family, Private Property and the State, asserted that the status of 
women was determined by the prevailing mode of production and its attendant 
property relations.36 Borrowing heavily from the works of anthropologists, 
Engels argued that the origin of patriarchy was rooted in the creation of private 
property. Despite the dubious merits of this argument, by historicizing the 
family, Engels brought into question the validity of the "innate" and "natural" 
functions of women that patriarchal discourse ascribed to them.37 
The other contribution of Marxism was to implicate capitalism and 
patriarchy in the oppression of women thus holding that the "woman question" 
could only exist in a capitalist society. If capitalism itself, by the laws of 
historical materialism, was doomed to extinction, so too was the cultural 
superstructure of capitalism that perpetuated the subordination of women. In 
the post-capitalist society women would be important primarily as units of 
labour. The Bolsheviks exhibited none of the ambiguity or Victorian 
reservations that Engels had about the use of women in factory production but 
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took very literally the second part of the Marxist dicta about the contribution 
of each according to his abilities. The Constitution that was adopted in 1918 
mandated labour as the primary duty of all citizens. And as Stalin said very 
succinctly, "it is not property status, not national origin, not sex, nor office, but 
personal ability and personal labor that determines the position of every citizen 
in society."38 
Continuing with the metaphor of productive labour were the twin issues of 
reproduction and domestic labour. Was the act of biological reproduction 
socially useful labour? It was Kollontai, the arch-feminist, who argued that as 
reproduction ultimately guaranteed the existence of the labour republic, the 
state should facilitate motherhood by providing ideal conditions for it.39 This 
argument received great prominence in the 1930s when biological 
reproduction was valorized as socially useful and necessary. On the issue of 
domestic labour, Marxists were unanimous in their condemnation of women's 
exclusive engagement in household tasks!O August Bebel, in his widely read 
work, Women under Socialism, painted a romantic picture of a post-socialist 
society where the bourgeois family would be redefined. Communal 
organizations would take on the tasks of cooking, cleaning, washing and 
childcare!' 
This was the essential contradiction of Marxism, on the one hand it 
envisaged the disappearance of the bourgeois state, and on the other, it foretold 
an enormous increase in the functions and power of the socialist state. 
Bolsheviks believed that the state should protect the rights of women and 
children, ensure that women had access to education, relieve women from the 
onus of domesticity, and promote them to positions of power and authority. The 
modern vision of both the affirmative action welfare state and the omni- 
competent state therefore, derived from Marxist thinking and Soviet pra~tice.4~ 
At the same time, given the material poverty of the country in the 1920s, 
political theorists were de-emphasizing the role of the state in women's 
emancipation and stressing the importance of grassroots a~tivisrn.4~ Leaders of 
the Party such as Lenin and Trotsky, and organizations such as the trade 
unions, subscribed to a notion of popular participation in officially sponsored 
"women's issues."44 Thus women were encouraged to set up sewing artels, 
poultry farms, co-operative daycare centers, and communal kitchens. The 
emphasis on improvisation, resilience, and magical female ability to sustain 
meaningful life and community in the middle of social dislocations and male 
incompetence was an important part of Bolshevik discourse. 
Where did men fit into this scenario of the state and women? If one reads 
the Marxist texts about conscious women one is struck by the progressive 
displacement of the male to the margins both figuratively and literally. 
Analyzing Engels' work, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State, Alfred Meyer commented thus: "throughout the book, Engels conveys 
the impression that matriarchy was preferable to male domination and that it 
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corresponded to a nobler and more humane way of life. Matriarchy reigned in 
a communistic, propertyless community blessed with equality, sexual freedom, 
general self-respect, and respect for others."45 While Bolsheviks never 
endorsed matriarchy as a political principle, in propaganda men were often 
represented as a hindrance that disrupted the social intercourse of the state and 
politically conscious women. Kollontai's fiction is replete with the symbolic 
erasure of men and the arbitrary silencing of their voices. As her stories 
progress, while her heroines grow stronger, men usually display a distressing 
capacity for degeneration, both moral and ideological.46 And in this instance 
the class affiliations of the anti-heroes is less important than their gender, as 
men of both proletarian and bourgeois origin seem susceptible to the pleasures 
of the flesh. And even during the years of Stalinist conservatism it was very 
common to find the symbolic dismemberment of male supremacy in stories 
about Stalinist heroines. 
But it is important to remember that Bolshevik ire was reserved for the 
local, the consanguinal male. There was no attempt to dismantle patriarchy per 
se, but an effort was made to replace the authority of the local male, of fathers, 
brothers, and husbands, with that of the absent, omnipotent, male of socialist 
patriarchy. This trend started with the veneration of the dead Lenin and other 
communist leaders and found its apotheosis in the cult of Stalin. The conflation 
of the image of the nation and the dictator did not lead to the strengthening of 
the father figure in the family as in fascist states. But because of the conjoining 
of socialist patriarchal discourse with modem narratives of female 
emancipation, it led to the symbolic emasculation of the authority of the local 
male, while valorizing women's capacity to improvise, sustain and survive. 
There were other essential criteria that constituted the lineaments of the 
female self in Bolshevik representations. One was the motif of backwardness, 
and the other, the situational identity of women. Marxist canonical writings on 
women contained several imaginative denunciations of unreconstructed 
Russian women and by extension of their femininity.47 But backwardness, 
conservatism, disinclination to action, was not considered as innately feminine 
characteristics, but a product of women's tragic past. For a party that claimed 
to be the vanguard of the future, the Bolsheviks were disproportionately 
obsessed with history in its dramatic capacity to provide a foil to the 
achievements of the revolution. And women's history was invariably narrated 
in the tragic mode familiar to those steeped in the literary traditions of 
Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Nekrasov. In the Bolshevik version, however, suffering 
was neither ennobling nor an inevitable mark of gender. Rather, women's 
suffering stemmed from a lack of understanding about the true reasons for 
their misfortune. As a result women privileged family over class, the domestic 
space over the social realm, and passivity over revolution. 
If women were to be partners in the revolution, they would have to shed 
the guise of Russian femininity and take on the persona of Bolshevik women; 
22 Left History 6.2 
their tverdost', their dedication to revolution, and their immense capacity for 
personal heroism and self-sa~rifice.4~ Bolshevik propaganda in the period 
under review, unlike liberalism, never used arguments from nature to reify 
women's basic incapacity to act as competent citizens in the public sphere. 
Instead the core tenet of Bolshevism rested on the assumption that the cultural 
reconstruction of women was possible as long as women made the choice to 
internalize the prescriptive mores and values inherent in Bolshevik 
propaganda. Bolshevism therefore was both a call to arms and a prescription 
for self-regenerati0n.4~ 
As is clear from the preceding section, the notion of the female comrade 
as articulated in Bolshevik propaganda was not the unencumbered self of 
liberal theory, the bearer of inviolable and individual rights. Rather, it was the 
situated self or the communitarian self, whose identity was located in the 
intersection of the obligations of social justice, the commonweal, and the Party. 
A woman's identity was imagined in terms of her relationship to the family, 
children, community, and state, but not necessarily in that order. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Bolsheviks used the status of women 
under Soviet rule as a way to prove their modernity and their vanguard position 
among the European nations.50 Lenin claimed in 1919 that, "the position of 
women furnishes a particularly graphic elucidation of the difference between 
bourgeois and socialist democracy . . . in no bourgeois republic . . . nowhere in 
the world, not even in the most advanced country, have women gained a 
position of complete equality."51 The veracity of the statement was far less 
important than the emergence of a particular style of discourse in which 
women functioned as a marker or an index of progressiveness. 
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION 
According to Ricouer, ideology is a positive phenomenon, "expressing the 
necessity for any group to give itself an image of itself, to fill the gap between 
its origin and its actuality, its founding project and its fading collective 
memory."52 Bolshevik ideology in this context was an attempt by a ruling class 
to make order out of chaos, to reduce the overwhelming flood of raw reality 
into accessible categories, and ultimately to reproduce the internal self- 
understanding of a dominant group.53 Bolshevik ideology was essentially 
performative rather than descriptive, programmatic rather than pragmatic, and 
therefore, extravagant and inconsistent. 
Soviet propaganda, the actual articulation of ideology, served a variety of 
functions. Ideology provided a generative frame of reference that both 
governed the production of this new genre and its interpretation. Propaganda 
was integral to the formation of a peculiarly Soviet identity. The literary 
strategies used to construct Soviet-speak are an important contribution to the 
categories of public speech, and thus deserve a hermeneutical analysis as a 
literary form. Party members, bureaucrats, exemplary school children, Soviet 
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heroines, all those who participated in the Soviet public sphere, operated 
within the intellectual world of propaganda. As a means of communication, 
Soviet-speak was cumbersome, repetitive, and over-laden with jargon. At the 
same time it was simple to master, and the ideology was so elastic that even 
those unacquainted with Marxist theory could comfortably converse within its 
perimeters. The important question is not whether the people believed it or 
even internalized it, but the fact that they articulated, repeated and perpetuated 
the categories of a Soviet weltanschauung, creating a space in which every 
Soviet citizen could participate, and cue into. Soviet-speak was perhaps one of 
the most unifying and stabilizing forces in the Soviet Union, and Soviet 
identity was fbndamentally related to the mastery of this body of coded 
phrases. 
The present debate on affirmative action in the United States serves as an 
example. Although people might not really believe in the politics of gender and 
racial parity, they are afraid to voice a public criticism because of the moral 
stance that feminist- and minority-politics has taken. Similarly, in the Soviet 
Union, although the exaggerated rhetoric about solving the "woman question" 
did not directly translate into improved living standards or the diminution of 
misogynistic attitudes, in the world of public utterances, the Soviets were loath 
to utter sentiments that might be construed as anti-women. Soviet propaganda, 
therefore, became a means of self-censorship, much like the category of 
"political correctness" in the United States today. 
Second, the rhetoric about women in the Soviet Union served as a means 
of legitimization for the regime. Soviet identity was created against an 
imagined European identity, both liberal and fascist. Soviet accomplishments 
were repeatedly contrasted with the deficiencies, shortcomings and limitations 
of a more "advanced" Western Europe. In this dialogue, the "New Soviet 
Woman" served as the embodiment of Soviet belief in gender equality and 
state welfare policies. Although the Soviet Union did not create a truly efficient 
system of childcare, or communal institutions that would take over the 
domestic tasks that women traditionally performed, it was a goal that the Soviet 
Union publicly adhered to. 
The idea of a welfare state responsive to women's needs was a novel 
innovation in politics, especially compared to the Western world in the 1920s 
and 1930s, where welfare policies were often seen as a temporary and 
charitable gesture towards distressed citizens. More commonly, in the West, 
welfare measures were intended to strengthen the patriarchal family and keep 
women out of the waged labour market.54 In a sense, by acknowledging the 
rights of citizens, the state was exposing itself to criticism for the non- 
fulfillment of its obligations. Although the Soviet women lacked the power to 
force the state to meet its self-proclaimed obligations, Soviet propaganda 
provided citizens with a yardstick against which they could measure the 
various deficiencies of the system. Therefore, in an unforeseen way, 
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propaganda could serve as a means of empowerment for the masses by 
providing a permissible vocabulary of complaint and criticism. 
Third, the model of the "New Soviet Woman" also served as a justification 
of the creative and innovative nature of the October Revolution. It was not 
mere happenstance that the propaganda surrounding both the Lenin and Stalin 
cults repeatedly emphasized the leaders' care for that politically backward 
cohort, women. But in the separate models of the "New Soviet Woman" that 
each period spawned one could gauge the difference between the Lenin and the 
Stalin cult. In the 1920s, the popular fictions of female destinies were 
personified in the imaginary denizens of a communist future, or in the pages 
of literature. Apart from the old Bolshevik female leaders, there were few 
memorable heroines of the NEP era. Those with claims to fame usually used 
their valorous participation in the Civil War to signify their importance to the 
revolution. 
In the 1930s by contrast, Stalinist propaganda did not dwell on the process 
of achievement of feminist goals, but merely reiterated its end results in 
exaggerated terms. Under Stalin, the material conditions had changed so 
dramatically, or so it was claimed in the propaganda, that Soviet heroines 
(modem women) were to be found in every corner of the Soviet Union.ss But 
the modernity of the "New Soviet Woman" was deeply ambiguous. If in her 
dedication to work and upward mobility, gender equality, efficient time 
management and nationalism, the Stalinist heroine exemplified the modem 
citizen, her pro-natalism, reliance on sisterhood, and devotion to Stalin was 
redolent of politics of a pre-modern era. 
Stalinism failed to fulfil1 the ideals of October in that gender parity 
remained an abstract dream throughout the life of the Soviet Union. The 
boundaries between the public and the private spheres of existence were not 
erased as the state failed to institute the welfare utopia it promised. But 
Stalinism did complete one part of the Bolshevik gender project; it managed to 
semiotically re-encode the category of "woman" in Soviet public discourse. 
Officially, Soviet women were never reviled as politicaIly immature or 
backward, instead, they continued to embody in the abstract the virtues and 
achievements of the Soviet system. 
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